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This article examines the Latvian documentary The Soviet Story E\(GYƯQVâQRUHDVD
militant Baltic memory project which seeks to establish the parity of East and West European 
experiences with totalitarian crimes in the pan-European memory narrative of twentieth-
century wars and genocide. The film offers a useful vantage point for investigating the 
interaction between memory politics and identity-building across the post-communist space 
and beyond. Claiming the inner similarity and moral equitability of Soviet communism and 
German National Socialism, The Soviet Story constitutes an epitome of the Historikerstreit in 
the Baltic fashion, debating the uniqueness of the Holocaust next to the crimes of communism. 
The so-called Holocaust template has been essential for the makers of the documentary in their 
insisting on the pan-European condemnation of totalitarian communist regimes in Europe, 
along with an invitation to critically review the role of the USSR in the Second World War. 
The Soviet Story is particularly critical about the Western discriminative standard of 
remembering the mass killings of Nazi Germany and the USSR, claiming such position’s 
unsustainability on intellectual, moral, and political grounds. The article investigates The Soviet 
Story as an example of the cultural front in the Baltic-Russian “memory war” over 
remembering the Soviet legacy, reading the film’s message in the context of the broader East 
European politics of seeking pan-European condemnation of the crimes of totalitarian 
communist regimes. It further discusses the transnational efficacy of such mnemopolitical 
projects against the backdrop of intensified activity on the information operations front in the 
Baltic-Russian relations in recent years. 










Ever since the gradual unravelling of the communist regimes in the Soviet Union and eastern 
Europe, a vigorous search for the “usable pasts” in order to make sense of the current political 
predicament has been going on in the region. Reaching for “memory”1 in order to establish a 
sense of continuity with the alleged original (national) self, untainted by the traumatic 
experience of communism, has become the order of the day. “Memory” has consequently been 
generally understood as an emotional source of healing and national reconstruction rather than 
yet another device vulnerable for political engineering, drawing upon which could possibly 
create as many new lines of division as it hopes to resolve the old ones. In the course of the 
attempted rebuilding of political subjectivity amidst fragmented memories of various 
encounters with multiple totalitarian regimes, the singularity of Holocaust as the negative 
foundational myth of the European Union (EU)2 has been challenged by the post-communist 
additions to the Union. The East European states have sought to make their experiences with 
communist regimes part of the pan-European mnemonical master narrative of the twentieth 
century next to the generally condemned Nazi legacy through the denunciation of 
1
 The concepts of social and/or collective memory are generally invoked to refer to intersubjectively shared views 
of the past, as held by a society/nation/community/group in (and from the demands of) the present. For good 
overviews among the considerable and burgeoning literature, see Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social 
Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical Sociology of Practices,” Annual Review of 
Sociology  24 (1998): 105-40; Jeffrey K. Olick, “Collective Memory: The Two Cultures,” Sociological Theory 
17, no. 3 (1999): 333-48; Siobhan Kattago, ed., The Ashgate Research Companion to Memory Studies (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2015). 
2
 Claus Leggewie, “Battlefield Europe: Transnational memory and European identity,” Eurozine, April 28 (2009), 
http://www.eurozine.com/battlefield-europe/ (accessed February 2, 2018). 
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totalitarianism as such.3 Meanwhile, they have wrestled with ebbing and flowing “memory 
wars” with Russia on the assessment of the Soviet legacy in the region.4 Yet again, these 
historic “bloodlands” of Europe5 have fallen in between the hegemonic forces in the continent 
– only this time in relation to the established European and Russian narrative orders of 
3
 Maria Mälksoo, “Criminalizing Communism: Transnational Mnemopolitics in Europe,” International Political 
Sociology 8, no. 1 (2014): 82-99; Laure Neumayer, “Integrating the Central European Past into a Common 
Narrative: The Mobilizations Around the ‘Crimes of Communism’ in the European Parliament,” Journal of 
Contemporary European Studies 23, no. 3 (2015): 344-63; Laure Neumayer, “Advocating for the Cause of the 
‘Victims of Communism’ in the European Political Space: Memory Entrepreneurs in Interstitial Fields,” 
Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 45, no. 6 (2017): 992-1012. For the European 
institutional playground of such attempts, see Siobhan Kattago, “Agreeing to Disagree on the Legacies of Recent 
History – Memory, Pluralism and Europe after 1989,” International Journal of Social Theory 12, no. 3 (2009): 
375-95; Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, “The EU Politics of Remembrance: Can Europeans Remember Together?,” 
West European Politics 35, no. 5 (2012): 1182-1202; Annabelle Littoz-Monnet, “Explaining Policy Conflict 
Across Institutional Venues: European Union-level Struggles Over the Memory of Holocaust,” JCMS: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 51, no. 3 (2013): 489-504; Aline Sierp, History, Memory and Trans-European Identity: 
Unifying Divisions (New York and London: Routledge, 2014); Oriane Calligaro, “Legitimation Through 
Remembrance? The Changing Regimes of Historicity of European Integration,” Journal of Contemporary 
European Studies 23, no. 3 (2015): 330-43; Philippe Perchoc, “Negotiating Memory at the European Parliament 
after the Enlargement,” European Review of International Studies 2, no. 2 (2015): 3-14. 
4
 Nikolay Koposov, Memory Laws, Memory Wars: The Politics of the Past in Europe and Russia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
5
 Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010). See also the 
Review Forum on the book in this journal: John Connelly et al., “Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe between 
Hitler and Stalin,” Journal of Genocide Research 13, no. 3 (2011): 313-52. Cf. Michael Geyer and Sheila 
Fitzpatrick, eds., Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and Nazism Compared (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
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remembrance, or “collective memory regimes”6 concerning the twentieth-century totalitarian 
crimes.  
This article focuses on a relatively recent “memory event” in this mnemonic struggle: 
the production and reception of the historical propaganda film,7 The Soviet Story by a Latvian 
director (GYƯQVâQRUH8 Alexander Etkind describes memory events as “secondary to 
the historical events that they interpret, usually taking place many years or decades later.”9 
Memory events are thus defined as temporal units of memory, as performatives that are 
“simultaneously acts and products of memory”, whose power depends on their truth claims 
(“whether the community perceives it as a true description of the past”), originality claims 
(“whether the community perceives it as new and different from the accepted version of the 
past”), and identity claims (“whether the community perceives the changing vision of the past 
6
 On memory regimes, see Michael Bernhard and Jan Kubik, eds., Twenty Years After Communism: The Politics 
of Memory and Commemoration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For a constructive critique of their 
framework on the Baltic cases, see Eva-Clarita Pettai, “Debating Baltic memory regimes: A discussion of Michael 
Bernard and Jan Kubik: Twenty years after Communism: The politics of memory and commemoration,” Journal 
of Baltic Studies 47, no. 2 (2016): 165-78. 
7
 On The Soviet Story  as propaganda, see Ivars ƮMDEV ³&LHQƯJD DWELOGH 6RYLHW 6WRU\´ 0D\  
http://www.lvportals.lv/emuari.php?id=44 (accessed: February 2, 2018). 
8
 The Soviet Story. Directed by (GYƯQVâQRUH5LJD3HUU\6WUHHW$GYLVRUV(GYƯQV Šnore (b. 1974) was 
elected to the Latvian Saeima as a member of the National Alliance coalition in 2014. See further 
http://titania.saeima.lv/personal/deputati/saeima12_depweb_public.nsf/0/6ce92a3b970461e5c2257d7b0032da07
?opendocument&lang=EN (accessed: February 2, 2018). 
9
 Alexander Etkind, Warped Mourning: Stories of the Undead in the Land of the Unburied (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2013), 178. 
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as central to its identity”).10 Hence, memory events revisit the past, creating ruptures with its 
established cultural meanings.11 The Soviet Story as a memory project, which was aimed at 
promoting a militant anti-Soviet narrative of twentieth-century history, offers a useful vantage 
point for examining the interaction between mnemopolitics and identity-building across the 
post-communist space and beyond. As a documentary, The Soviet Story is striking for its 
distinct medium of representation, “laying claim to (parts of) truth and reality” and “moving 
smoothly between fact and fiction, education and entertainment.”12 Sponsored by conservative 
European parliamentarians13 as a counterpoint to the Russian documentary The Baltic 
Nazism,14 and aimed at a global audience, The Soviet Story, together with the history of the 
controversies that it sparked, can serve to illuminate the interaction between the transnational, 
regional and national dimensions of the ongoing struggle between competing narratives of the 
Second World War and the communist experience, and their wider political ramifications. The 
Soviet Story depicts eastern Europe as the historical meeting point of totalitarian terror in 
twentieth-century Europe, and an important trope in the debates over remembering the crimes 
of totalitarian regimes. If dealing with the past generally takes the shape of “trials, purges, or 
history lessons,”15 The Soviet Story’s main gist is of the latter category. At least metaphorically, 
10
 Etkind, Warped Mourning, 178-79. 
11
 Uilleam Blacker and Alexander Etkind, “Introduction,” in Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe, ed. Uilleam 
Blacker, Alexander Etkind, and Julie Fedor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 6-7. 
12
 Rens van Munster and Casper Sylvest, “Documenting International Relations: Documentary Film and the 
Creative Arrangement of Perceptibility,” International Studies Perspectives 16, no. 3 (2015): 229-45, 229. 
13
 See further Neumayer, “Advocating for the cause of the ‘victims of Communism’”, 1003. 
14
 Natsizm po Pribaltyski [Nazism Baltic style]. Directed by Boris Chertkov. Moscow: Third Rome, 2006.  
15
 Timothy Garton Ash, “Trials, Purges and History Lessons: Treating a Difficult Past in Post-Communist 
Europe,” in Memory and Power in Post-War Europe, ed. Jan-Werner Müller (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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the film also seeks justice via a broad condemnation of the Soviet experiment, effectively 
striving for an abolition of its allegedly prevalent remembrance as an enterprise flawed in 
practice, yet still commendable in ideology. 
This article dissects the political intervention The Soviet Story seeks to make in the 
European memoryscape of the Second World War and the totalitarian legacies of the twentieth 
century. Whereas previous academic takes on The Soviet Story have investigated the social 
media “afterlife” of the film,16 my primary objective here is to offer a conceptual diagnosis of 
the film as a symptom of contemporary memory politics in eastern Europe. To pursue this aim, 
I engage a critical interpretive reading of The Soviet Story, applying Lene Hansen’s inter-
visual/intertextual analytical model which calls for a simultaneous examination of the visual 
and its immediate intertextual context, along with the wider policy discourse and the 
constitutions of the visual material ascribing meaning to it.17 In order to explore the 
mnemopolitical productivity of The Soviet Story from a broader ethico-political angle, I 
proceed from van Munster and Sylvest’s threefold typology of the political efficacy of 
documentary films, entailing exposition, disclosure and/or destabilization, respectively.18 I set 
out from the hypothesis that even though The Soviet Story seeks to destabilize the familiar and 
accepted narrative of the Second World War where the “good” Allies beat the evil “Nazis,” it 
falls short of offering “the framing through which reality is rendered perceptible to critical 
Press, 2004), 265–82, 271. 
16
 See 0ƗUWLƼã.DSUƗQV³+HJHPRQLF5HSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI͒the Past and Digital Agency: Giving Meaning to ‘The 
Soviet Story’ on Social Networking Sites,” Memory Studies 9, no. 2 (2016): 156–72. 
17
 Lene Hansen, “Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammed Cartoon 
Crisis,” European Journal of International Relations 17, no. 1 (2011): 51-74, 51. 
18
 Van Munster and Sylvest, “Documenting International Relations,” 233. 
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scrutiny,”19 and thus misses the mark of the politics of destabilization in the vein of critical 
history.    
 The article unfolds in three moves. The following section examines The Soviet Story as 
an example of the cultural front of the Baltic-Russian “memory war” on remembering the 
Soviet legacy. Consequently, the core message of this “spectacular act of political 
communication”20 is read in the context of the East European politics of seeking pan-European 
condemnation of the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes. The article concludes with a 
concise discussion of the transnational productivity of mnemopolitical projects such as The 
Soviet Story in light of the increasingly robust Russian (mis)information campaigns regarding 
the historical and contemporary issues of political relevance.21 
 
The Soviet Story as a Cultural Front of the Baltic-Russian Memory War 
I propose to interpret The Soviet Story in the context of the contested right to memory in 
contemporary Europe against the backdrop of the broader East European politics of seeking 
pan-European condemnation of totalitarian communist regimes in explicitly universalist moral 
and political terms.22 This film is a noteworthy event in the series of moves launched by various 
East European state and non-state actors struggling for the recognition of the region’s particular 
historical legacies as part of the pan-European normative verdict on twentieth-century 
19
 Ibid., 241. 
20
 .DSUƗQV³+HJHPRQLF5HSUHVHQWDWLRQVRI͒the Past,” 157.  
21
 For background and discussion, see Jukka Rislakki, The Case for Latvia: Disinformation Campaigns against a 
Small Nation, trans. Richard Impola (Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi, 2014). 
22
 Mälksoo, “Criminalizing Communism.” Note that this East European recognition-seeking is hardly unvarying 
across the region: the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia have been comparatively more vocal 
in these struggles across the distinct EU and Council of Europe fora. 
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totalitarianisms.23 Formatted as a cinematic show trial on the Soviet Union, and sponsored by 
the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) group in the European Parliament,24 along with the 
Riga City Council, the film was premiered at the European Parliament on 9 April 2008, with 
an aim at exerting pressure to the representatives to condemn the criminal legacy of the 
communist regimes in Europe. While a more immediate contextual impetus for the film was 
provided by the mnemopolitical resurgence of Vladimir Putin during his second term in office 
as the president of Russia, The Soviet Story’s linking of the two-headed danger of 
totalitarianism in the Europe of 1930s and contemporary Russia carried a clear political 
message for the then recently enlarged EU. Pursuing the understanding of Russia as still a 
threat to the European values in general and the Baltic statehood in particular, The Soviet Story 
constituted, on the one hand, a politically supported move in the information offensive against 
the allegedly resurgent Russia, as well as an attempt to win broader European support to the 
Latvian/Baltic assessment of the communist experience, on the other. It speaks volumes in this 
context that the director of the film was immediately decorated with state honours by his own 
native Latvia as well as by the president of Estonia. Meanwhile, the screening of the film 
sparked a series of protests in Russia and elsewhere, with the youth organisation Rossiia 
Molodaia burning an effigy of The Soviet Story’s director outside the Latvian embassy in May 
2008.25  
23
 See further Maria Mälksoo, “The Memory Politics of Becoming European: The East European Subalterns and 
the Collective Memory of Europe,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 4 (2009): 653-80. 
24
 Union for Europe of the Nations was a political group of the European Parliament active between 1999 and 
2009, combining national-conservative and Eurosceptic forces. See 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_for_Europe_of_the_Nations (accessed: February 2, 2018). 
25
 The Economist, “Telling the Soviet Story,” May 22, 2008, http://www.economist.com/node/11401983 
(accessed February 2, 2018). For a more recent “memory war” along the similar lines, largely fought out in the 
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While an artefact of cultural memory, such as a novel or a film, might theoretically 
open some avenues of thought concealed by the politically promoted “national” discourse, or 
at least broaden the prevailing official narrative, The Soviet Story as a historical documentary 
rather seconds to the central Latvian script of the Second World War, and the background and 
meaning of the Soviet period in Latvia, the Baltic states, as well as in the broader East European 
region in general. The Soviet Story folds into the predominant mnemopolitical narrative that 
Latvia as a state has been pursuing after re-establishing its sovereignty in 1991. Yet, it is also 
a cultural artefact, or an expression of a paramount social memory of the communist experience 
among the Latvians. The central elements of this narrative are the condemnation of the illegal 
annexation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union in the course of the Second World War, the 
restoration of the independent Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian statehood on the principle of 
legal continuity with the pre-Second World War republics, and the consideration of the Soviet 
Union as one of the major aggressors in the war. Latvia has become one of the most persistent 
pursuers of criminal and historical justice26 vis-à-vis former communist regimes. Along with 
social media, see NATO’s short clip about the Baltic post-World War anti-Soviet partisans (the so-called “forest 
brothers”), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h5rQFp7FF9c (accessed: February 2, 2018). For the Russian 
reactions, see https://www.rt.com/politics/396208-historical-perversion-russian-officials-blast/ (accessed: 
February 2, 2018) and https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russian-spokesperson-slams-nato-film-baltic-
resistance-58379 (accessed: February 2, 2018). 
26
 See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)  for this taxonomy of transitional 
justice. On transitional justice in the former communist bloc in general, see Lavinia Stan, Transitional Justice in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the Communist Past (Abingdon, Oxon. and New 
York: Routledge, 2009), and in the Baltic states in particular, see Eva-Clarita Onken, “The Politics of Finding 
Historical Truth: Reviewing Baltic History Commissions and their Work,” Journal of Baltic Studies 39, no. 1 
(2007): 109-16; Eva-Clarita Pettai, “The Convergence of Two Worlds: Historians and Emerging Histories in the 
Baltic States,” in Forgotten Pages in Baltic History: Inclusion and Exclusion in History. A Festschrift for John 
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the other Baltic states and Poland, it has incessantly argued for a pan-European moral, political 
and legal condemnation of the totalitarian communist crimes in Europe. Latvia was among the 
six East European states in 2010 calling the European Commission to criminalize the denial of 
crimes perpetrated by communist regimes in the same way a number of EU countries have 
banned the public condoning, denial and gross trivialization of the Holocaust.27 
 The film departs from a similar premise that has informed the work of Latvia’s 
Commission of Historians28 which has studied the crimes against humanity during the 
country’s consecutive subjugation to Soviet and Nazi German rule after the Second World 
War: namely, the alleged Western ignorance (if not general misinformation) about the darker 
chapters of the Soviet legacy in eastern Europe. Just as the Commission of Historians of Latvia 
took notice of an “urgent need to respond to Western misconceptions and official Russian 
Hiden, ed. Martyn Housden and David J. Smith (Amsterdam & New York: Rodopi, 2011); Eva-Clarita Pettai and 
Vello Pettai, Transitional and Retrospective Justice in the Baltic States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2015). 
27
 Mälksoo, “Criminalizing Communism.” 
28
 The Baltic “history commissions” were set up to sort out the records of the totalitarian regimes during and after 
the Second World War in the Baltic states by the respective presidents of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1998. 
See The International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes 
in Lithuania,  https://www.komisija.lt/en/ (accessed February 2, 2018); the Estonian International Commission 
for the Investigation of Crimes against Humanity, http://www.historycommission.ee/ (accessed: February 2, 
2018 DQG WKH &RPPLVVLRQ RI +LVWRULDQV RI /DWYLD /DWYLMDV YƝVWXUQLHNX NRPLVLMD
https://www.president.lv/lv/darbibas-jomas/komisijas-un-padomes/vesturnieku-komisija (accessed February 2, 
2018). For an overview of the Latvian commission’s work, see Andrejs Plakans, “The Commission of Historians 
in Latvia: 1999 to The Present,” Journal of Baltic Studies (August 8, 2014), 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01629778.2014.93790.   
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positions that are still based on Soviet ideological myths” in 2005,29 the dramatic opening of 
The Soviet Story follows the pitch by claiming that after the Second World War, “the memory 
of millions innocent victims was erased from history.” While the initial emphasis of 
particularly the Latvian and Lithuanian state-sponsored “history commissions” was on the 
Holocaust and the question of the local involvement in Nazi mass killings (due to their pre-war 
and wartime ethnic composition), the deliberate significance attributed to the analysis and 
evaluation of the two totalitarian regimes in the interactive framework, and the choice to 
“compare their structures and impacts without relativizing one over the other”30 nonetheless 
sent a clear political message to the West and further to the East from the founders of these 
commissions. Evidently, The Soviet Story carries on this very torch by its strive to enlighten 
the world about the “real face” of Soviet communism. Herein lies the film’s expository zeal 
regarding the “false beliefs” about the Soviet experiment and legacy, and its ambition to 
“persuade or convince an audience about the real (but not immediately perceptible) state of 
affairs.”31  
Latvia’s way of working out its twentieth-century past  has been rather bold in 
general.32 Compared to its Estonian counterpart, for instance, the Latvian Commission of 
Historians has used the g-word (i.e. “genocide”33) in a more permissive manner, applying it 
29
 Valters Nollendorfs and Erwin Oberlander, eds., The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia under Soviet and 
Nazi Occupation 1940-1991. Symposium of the Commission of the Historians of Latvia 14 (Riga: Institute of the 
History of Latvia, 2005), 10.  
30
 Onken, “The Politics of Finding Historical Truth,” 110. 
31
 Van Munster and Sylvest, “Documenting International Relations, ” 234. 
32
 But cf. Pettai and Pettai, Transitional and Retrospective Justice. 
33
 Defined by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) as an act 
“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.” Yet, as a 
concept, “genocide” entails legal, empirical, moral and political dimensions, and remains fiercely contested along 
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also to the losses among the titular population through mass deportations and terror during the 
1940s, whilst the Estonian commission has restricted its usage of the notion only to the mass 
killing of the local Jewish and Roma population during the Nazi occupation of Estonia.34 It is 
hardly surprising, against the backdrop of the Latvian Commission’s diligence in insisting on 
the “Soviet genocide,”35 that the fourteenth volume of the intermediate reports by the 
Commission of Historians of Latvia, titled as The Hidden and Forbidden History of Latvia 
under Soviet and Nazi Occupations 1940–1991,36 has been found to be “almost too politically 
contentious and thus rather vulnerable to scholarly criticism” for the way of presenting its 
research findings.37 Meanwhile, Olaf Mertelsmann and Aigi Rahi-Tamm, historians at the 
University of Tartu, Estonia, have suggested “different waves of cleansing and repression,” 
rather than “genocide,” as a more apt descriptor of the nature of Soviet violence in Estonia, 
considering the diversity of its victims, targets and means, for arguably criminal neglect rather 
than deliberate genocidal intent was behind the majority of related deaths.38 
them all. See further Scott Straus, “Contested meanings and conflicting imperatives: a conceptual analysis of 
genocide,” Journal of Genocide Research 3, no. 3 (2001): 349-75, 359. 
34
 For a sweeping analysis of post-1989 Central and East European “history wars” as the “search of lost genocide,” 
see Evgeny Finkel, “In Search of Lost Genocide: Historical Policy and International Politics in Post-1989 Eastern 
Europe,” Global Society 24, no. 1 (2010): 51-70. 
35
 See further Lauri Mälksoo, “Soviet Genocide? Communist Mass Deportations in the Baltic States and 
International Law,” Leiden Journal of International Law 14, no. 4 (2001): 757-87. 
 
36
 Nollendorfs and Oberlander, The Hidden and Forbidden History. 
37
 Onken, “The Politics of Finding Historical Truth,” 114. 
38
 Olaf Mertelsmann and Aigi Rahi-Tamm, “Soviet mass violence in Estonia revisited,” Journal of Genocide 
Research 11, no. 2-3 (2009): 307-22. 
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Compared to Estonia, Latvia has also pointed its attempts of transitional criminal justice 
more directly to the hornet’s nest of the legal-political dispute with the Russian Federation 
about the universal versus the particularistic applicability of the Nuremberg law39 in charging 
and convicting a former Soviet partisan Vasily Kononov with war crimes for his killing of the 
civilians in the German-occupied Latvia in 1944.40 In its purposefully evocative style, The 
Soviet Story matches the courageous example set by the Latvian legal battle against the 
discriminatory concept of war crime in the Kononov case. Both The Soviet Story and Latvia’s 
case against Kononov are instances of the country’s attempt, via cultural and legal means 
respectively, to universalise the Nuremberg standards, rendering them applicable to the 
victorious Allies (i.e. the USSR) as well as to Nazi Germany.41 By its absolute moral 
detestation and political denunciation of the Soviet regime, The Soviet Story fits the general 
Baltic pattern of condemning the communist legacy.42 The thrust of The Soviet Story further 
39
 “Nuremberg law” in the comprehensive sense refers to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for 
Nuremberg; the judgment issued at the trial, and the later established Nuremberg Principles building on the former 
two. 
40
 Lauri Mälksoo, “Kononov v. Latvia,” The American Journal of International Law 105, no. 1 (2011): 101-8. 
41
 For an extensive discussion of the case, see Maria Mälksoo, “Kononov v. Latvia as an Ontological Security 
Struggle over Remembering the Second World War,” in Law and Memory: Towards Legal Governance of 
History, ed. Uladzislau Belavusau and Aleksandra GliszczyĔVND-Grabias (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 91-108. 
42
 Estonia’s official declaration On the Historical-Legal Evaluation of the Events of 1940 in Estonia (1989) 
qualified the Soviet takeover of the country as “an act of aggression,” “a military occupation” and “an annexation.” 
In 2002, the Estonian parliament Riigikogu adopted a resolution On the Crimes of the Occupation Regimes in 
Estonia, condemning the crimes of all the occupation regimes in the country. In Latvia, the first paragraph of the 
Law Concerning the Determination of Repressed Status for Persons Who Suffered Under the Communist and Nazi 
Regimes (1995) considers as criminal “the ideologies of communism and Nazism, the communist and Nazi 
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resonates closely with the Baltic “memory offensive” launched by the Latvian president 9DƯUD
9ƯƷH-Freiberga in 2005 in order to shake the selective ignorance about the role of the Soviet 
Union in the Second World War and enlighten the European political circles about the 
complicated predicament of the Baltic states during the war.43 It further resonates with the 
endeavours of the conservative Baltic and Polish Members of European Parliament (MEPs) at 
seeking equal recognition for the victims of communism and Nazism.44  
The mnemopolitical pivot of The Soviet Story is nonetheless considerably more 
controversial than the official mnemonical narrative pursued by the Latvian state at the 
international level. Not only does The Soviet Story insist on the co-responsibility of the Soviet 
Union for the outbreak of the Second World War, as well as depict the USSR as one of the 
main aggressors in the war, but the film portrays communism as criminal in nature, that is, in 
its ideological essence, not just in the way the USSR put it into practice. The film points to a 
totalitarian regimes, and the political repressions.” Latvian Saeima issued a Declaration on condemnation of the 
totalitarian communist occupation regime implemented in Latvia by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 
2005. In Lithuania, the Resolution on the 1939 Pacts between Germany and the USSR and the Annulment of their 
Consequences to Lithuania (1989) condemned Soviet aggression against Lithuania in 1940, and declared the 
occupation and annexation international crimes. Importantly, the Constitutional Act no I-2622 of 1992 prohibits 
Lithuania’s participation “into any political, economic and military state unions built on the basis of the former 
USSR.” 
43
 Maria Mälksoo, “The First Lady of the Baltic ‘Memory Offensive’”, Diplomaatia 47, 
http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/the-first-lady-of-the-baltic-memory-offensive/ (accessed: February 2, 
2018). 
44
 Katja Wezel has characterized Latvian memory politics at the European level as a continuation of Latvia’s quest 
for acknowledgement of its suffering and victimhood. See Katja Wezel, “The unfinished business of perestroika: 
Latvia’s memory politics and its quest for acknowledgement of victimhood in Europe,” Nationalities Papers: The 
Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity 44, no. 4 (2016): 560-77, 567. 
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distinct genocidal intent behind the man-made famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine, as epitomized 
in the thesis of the Soviet Union having helped Nazi Germany to “instigate the Holocaust” in 
the context of the Second World War. EmphasizLQJWKDWWKH.DW\ĔPDVVDFUHVZHUHWKHILUVW
mass killings of this scale in the Second World War,45 and that the Kremlin strategically 
orchestrated the ethnic cleansing in the Baltics in order to make space for the Russian-speakers, 
the main message of the film is directly targeted at the heart of the alleged Western moral and 
political consensus about Holocaust as the ultimate and universal standard of the twentieth-
century political atrocities – one that has implicitly justified the fight against those responsible 
for this super-crime with any means possible. Claiming the inner similarity and moral 
equitability of Soviet communism and German National Socialism, The Soviet Story thus 
constitutes an epitome of the Historikerstreit in the Baltic way. The so-called “Holocaust 
template”46 has been essential for the makers of The Soviet Story in their encouragement of a 
pan-European condemnation of totalitarian communist regimes in Europe, along with an 
invitation to critically review the role of the USSR in the Second World War. Šnore is 
particularly critical about the Western discriminative standard of relating to the mass killings 
of Nazi Germany and the USSR, claiming its unsustainability on intellectual, moral, and 
political grounds. The Soviet Story maintains that the criminality of Soviet communism has not 
been sufficiently acknowledged thus far, as it appears to be still morally acceptable to use and 
45
 For various rememberings of .DW\ĔVHH$OH[DQGHU(WNLQGHWDORemembering Katyn (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2012).  
46
 Jüri Luik, “Our duty,” Diplomaatia 54 (special edition), 16-18,  http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/our-duty/ 
(accessed: February 2, 2018). 
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commodify the symbols of communism.47 The film is keen on underscoring the close 
resemblance and moral equitability of Soviet communism and German National Socialism, as 
both ideologies and regimes attempted to build a “new man;” both were arguably “doctrinally 
based on Marxism”48; both did “not just commit criminal acts,” but were “criminal enterprises 
in their very essence,” utilizing similar tactics of eliminating people. The film seeks to engage 
in further myth-busting by emphasizing that the criminality of Soviet communism did not find 
its climax in Stalinism, but the pattern of atrocities was launched already by Lenin. Likewise, 
it is maintained that the myth of Khrushchev as a “good communist” should be taken with a 
grain of salt. Most importantly, the ideological immorality of communism is depicted as 
stemming from the Marxist idea of political genocide. As one of the interviewees of the film, 
the late University of Cambridge scholar George Watson49 puts it: “Marx was the father of 
modern political genocide. Killing off the parasites of society was what Marxian socialism was 
about.” Yet, The Soviet Story’s criticism of Engels and the moral bankruptcy of the latter’s 
47
 In early 2005, soon after the EU’s enlargement to the former communist countries of eastern Europe, an 
initiative was spearheaded by Jószef Szájer from Hungary and Vytautas Landsbergis from Lithuania to urge the 
EU ban of the communist symbols (i.e. sickle and hammer) alongside with the Nazi ones. The European 
Commission rejected the extension of the Europe-wide ban to cover communist symbols shortly thereafter. 
48
 See the interview with George Watson in the film. 
49
 For some context, see https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/people/george-watson-1927-
2013/2006968.article (accessed: February 2, 2018). The other prominent interviewees of The Soviet Story include 
Norman Davies, the renowned historian of Europe; Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovsky; French, Ukrainian and 
Russian historians, and Members of European Parliament (MEPs), such as, Inese Vaidere, Christopher Beazley, 
Girts Valdis Kristovskis, Ari Vatanen, 
and Wojciech Roszkowski. 
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scathing remarks on the so-called Völkerabfälle has been challenged by historians.50 The 
English translation provided for the word by Watson in the film is indeed deceiving – “racial 
trash” does not quite capture the original meaning of the word as used by Engels in his quoted 
article of 1849 in Neue Rheinische Zeitung. A more precise translation would be “residual 
nations” or “refuse of nations,” that is, those left behind, or discarded, by the dominant 
civilizations. The synonyms in the political lexicon of Engels, used in parallel to the 
Völkerabfälle are more illuminating here: Völkertrümmer (the left-overs of nations), or 
Völkerruinen (the ruins of nations) imply the left-overs of previously existing, then disappeared 
nations, or the remnants of the great historical nations (e.g., southern Slavs which had formerly 
lived in Austrian territory). The issue for Engels was really about whether these nations were 
sufficiently strong for establishing their own nation-states, not their destruction. Engels rather 
pointed to the inevitable assimilation of the stateless nations in case they were unable to 
construct the states of their own, but he did not argue for their physical destruction as claimed 
by Watson in the film. 
Last not least, the film’s underpinning message points at Russia’s persisting non-
acceptance of the criminal legacy of the Soviet regime as a security problem for contemporary 
Europe. With a link drawn between the pompous celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end 
of the Second World War in Moscow in 2005 and that of the first anniversary of the war – 
where the Soviets and Nazis celebrated together due to the Hitler-Stalin, or as it is more known 
in the Baltic states, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, it is implied that contemporary Russia 
is effectively the heir of the political tradition of its predecessor state. 
50
 See further Mart Kivimäe, “Ajalugu õpetab kineast: Edvins Snore, ‘Nõukogude lugu’ ja selle didaktiline 
problem” [History taught by a Cineast: Edvins Snore’s The Soviet Story and its Didactic Problem], Sirp, October 
15, 2009, http://www.sirp.ee/s1-artiklid/c9-sotsiaalia/ajalugu-opetab-kineast/ (accessed: February 2, 2018). 
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Hardly surprisingly, the mnemopolitics of The Soviet Story have been reciprocated with 
a strongly wounded reaction from Russia, where the film has been frequently quoted as an 
epitome of crude “falsification of history.” 51 In 2009, the Presidential Commission to Counter 
Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia’s Interests was established in Russia in 
order to retaliate symbolic initiatives to establish an official equivalence between Stalinism and 
Nazism. While the Commission has been dissolved by now, Russia’s State Duma passed a 
“memory law” in the spring of 2014, criminalizing the public remembrance of certain aspects 
of the Second World War, aimed directly against the “dissemination of false information on the activities 
of the Soviet Union during the Second World War,” and stipulating concrete penalties in case of its 
violation.52 In its openly revisionist ambition, The Soviet Story would clearly fall within the remit 
of this legislation. 
 
The Soviet Story as a Memory Event in the Struggle for a “European Memory” of 
Totalitarian Crimes 
The Soviet Story was thus aimed to be a particularly sensational stir-up of the conventional 
Western narrative of the Second World War as ultimately a “good war” where the Allied 
51
 For a symptomatic example, see Alexander Dyukov, “The Soviet Story – The Tissue of Lies,” April 13, 2011, 
http://rugraz.net/index.php/ru/istoricheskoe-dostoinstvo/mifi-o-rossii-i-cccp/1009-alexander-dukov-the-soviet-
story-the-tissue-of-lies (accessed: February 2, 2018). See also “The Soviet story: ɩɟɪɜɵɣɩɪɨɫɦɨɬɪ” The New 
Chronicles, June 6, 2008, novchronic.ru/1393.htm (accessed: February 2, 2018). Meanwhile, the film was 
generally well received in the West: for instance, it won the Mass Impact Award at the Boston Film Festival of 
2008. 
52
 See Art. 354.1. on the Rehabilitation of Nazism of the Russian Penal Code. For discussion, see Nikolay 
Koposov, ‘ɉɚɦɹɬɶ ɜ ɡɚɤɨɧɟ ɉɪɨ ɢɫɬɨɪɢɸ’, Russkii Zhurnal, April 8, 2014, http://www.russ.ru/Mirovaya-
povestka/Pamyat-v-zakone (accessed: February 2, 2018). 
 21 
                                                 
  
Coalition was supposedly acting on the common ground of anti-Nazism. By graphically 
building the case for exposing the Nazi-Soviet wartime “partnership in crime,” the film 
presents a powerful demand for reconsidering the “good” and the “evil” in the context of the 
war, as well as including the experiences of the subaltern participants in the war, most 
prominently the Baltic states, Poland, and Ukraine – with the respective emphases on 
deportations, the secret protocols of the Molotov-5LEEHQWURS3DFW.DW\ĔDQG+RORGRPRU– in 
the pan-European remembrance and moral verdict of the war. The film constitutes an 
exemplary attack in the mnemopolitical struggle against a version of the victors’ history and 
victors’ justice, fought by a representative of a small nation that was first caught in between 
the totalitarian powers in the Second World War, and later discovered itself as trapped in 
between the dominant Western and Russian narratives of the war. Content-wise, the central 
argument of The Soviet Story is very close to the recent scholarly attempts to dispute the 
popular assumptions about the central dates, geography, and methods of the Second World 
War, such as Timothy Snyder’s Bloodlands (2010) and Norman Naimark’s Stalin’s Genocides 
(2010).53 Šnore’s style of presentation is quite a different matter, however, as the narrative of 
The Soviet Story is shaped in a way it would fit a propaganda film format. The willfully 
propagandistic tone and the deliberately shocking montage of the imagery in order to expose 
the ideological, moral, and criminal equitability of the two totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-
century Europe is only part of the debatable tastefulness of the film director’s approach.54 The 
far more problematic issue that potentially seriously undermines the historical thrust of the film 
is its diffusion of Marxism, Bolshevism, and Stalinism in a rich brew of Soviet totalitarianism 
without properly distinguishing between the different ideological forms and social movements, 
53
 Norman Naimark, Stalin’s Genocides (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
54
 See also Neil Genzlinger, “Atrocities Magnified,” The New York Times, October 24, 2008. 
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between the strands of political thought and practice.55 Interestingly enough, this old debate 
over the (in)distinguishability of the idea and praxis of communism was recently reinvigorated 
in Estonia, against the backdrop of the refusal of Greek Minister of Justice, Stavros Kontonis, 
to take part of the meeting of the EU Ministers of Justice on the crimes of communism in 
Tallinn on August 23, 2017.56 
The mnemopolitics of Šnore’s film has an obvious agenda vis-à-vis securing a pan-
European moral and political condemnation of the “Soviet story” as it emphasizes the 
psychological difference of the so-called “new” Europe from the “old,”57 examining the impact 
of the Soviet experiment on the eastern side of the continent, and asking for the reconsideration 
of the alleged Western ambivalence toward the criminal legacy of the Soviet Union. The film 
55
 Kivimäe, “Ajalugu õpetab kineast.” 
56
 See Ahto Lobjakas, “Tänapäevase kommunismi ja natsismi lühike ABC” [A Brief ABC of the Contemporary 
Communism and Nazism],  Postimees, August 25, 2017, https://arvamus.postimees.ee/4222425/ahto-lobjakas-
tanapaevase-kommunismi-ja-natsismi-luhike-abc (accessed: February 2, 2018); Mihhail Lotman, “Ka 
kommunism vajab oma Nürnbergi protsessi” [Communism Has to Have its Nuremberg as well],  Postimees, 
August 28, 2017, https://arvamus.postimees.ee/4224411/mihhail-lotmani-vastus-ahto-lobjakale-ka-kommunism-
vajab-oma-nurnbergi-protsessi (accessed: February 2, 2018); Rein Ruutsoo, “Üks tont käib ringi mööda Eestit” 
[A Specter is Haunting Estonia], Postimees, August 29, 2017, https://arvamus.postimees.ee/4226243/rein-
ruutsoo-vastus-ahto-lobjakale-uks-tont-kaib-ringi-mooda-eestit (accessed: February 2, 2018); Andres Herkel, 
“Praegused rahvuslikkuse muttatampimise talgud ei pruugi meile sugugi hästi lõppeda” [The Current Stampede 
of Nationalism May Not End So Well For Us], Delfi, September 4, 2017, http://epl.delfi.ee/news/arvamus/andres-
herkel-praegused-rahvuslikkuse-muttatampimise-talgud-ei-pruugi-meile-sugugi-hasti-loppeda?id=79397104 
(accessed: February 2, 2018). 
57
 For an extensive discussion of the tropes of “new Europe” and “old Europe” in the post-Cold War era, see 
Chapter 4 in Maria Mälksoo, The Politics of Becoming European: A Study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War 
Security Imaginaries (London & New York: Routledge, 2010), 55-82. 
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accuses both Russia as the political heir of the main culprit, the USSR, and the “West” for its 
complicity in leaving the East of Europe up for grabs to the Soviet Union after the Second 
World War, and its current indifference vis-à-vis its eastern counterparts’ pains of 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung. It seeks to explain via dramatic illustrations, to shatter and stun. 
As an instance of visual securitization, “that is, when images constitute something or someone 
as threatened and in need of immediate defense,”58 the sought political intervention of The 
Soviet Story needs to be explored in the broader context of political, media, and academic 
discourses interacting with it as texts (intertextuality) and visuals (intervisuality).59 By constant 
inter-visual references to the archival materials on Nazi crimes, the political work of The Soviet 
Story is situated within an intertextual context of the earlier historians’ debates about the 
comparability of German National Socialism and Soviet communism.60 The film is 
furthermore part of a broader campaign launched from multiple East European quarters, calling 
for the pan-European condemnation of totalitarian communist crimes on par with the Nazi 
crimes in Europe. Yet, considering the flow of political declarations and resolutions by the 
European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, 
condemning the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes in various ways, some of which 
preceded the film by a few years, the pivot of The Soviet Story comes across as rushing to open 
a door already ajar.61  
58
 Hansen, “Theorizing the Image for Security Studies,” 51. 
59
 Cf. ibid., 55. 
60
 In particular, Stéphane Courtois et al., The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, trans. 
Jonathan Murphy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
61
 Still, two important resolutions followed suit only in 2009: the Vilnius Declaration of the OSCE’s Parliamentary 
Assembly of July 2009 (“On Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the OSCE 
Region in the 21st Century”) that, in turn, recalled the initiative of the European Parliament of 2 April 2009 “to 
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The pan-Europeanisation pursuits of the largely East European reckonings with 
communism – of which The Soviet Story is among the most noteworthy cultural advances –
have attempted to create a European memory of totalitarianism, thereby considerably swaying 
the hegemony of the traditional Holocaust-centric mnemonical narrative of the twentieth-
century atrocities conducted in Europe. Featuring strong rhetorical undercurrents with the so-
called Cold War liberalism, the struggle for the recognition of the assessment of the Soviet 
legacy as part of the pan-European understanding of criminal totalitarianism brings home the 
discursively contested nature of the “European memory,” and the way it is interwoven with 
power relations constituting it.62 This political campaign has been fuelled by long-hidden 
grievances over allegedly insufficient recognition of the eastern Europeans’ particular 
historical experiences in the context of the Second World War and their suffering under both 
proclaim 23 August, when the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed 70 years ago, as a Europe-wide Day of 
Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, in order to preserve the memory of the victims of mass 
deportations and exterminations.” As of 2017, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Poland, 
Hungary, Slovenia, as well as Canada, Georgia, and the United States have followed the call. While the Vilnius 
Declaration acknowledged “the uniqueness of the Holocaust,” it still equated “two major totalitarian regimes, 
Nazi and Stalinist, which brought about genocide, violations of human rights and freedoms, war crimes and crimes 
against humanity,” and expressed deep concern at the glorification of the totalitarian regimes. See European 
Parliament, “European Conscience and Totalitarianism,” Resolution P6_TA(2009) 0213 (Brussels: European 
Parliament, 2009); OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, “On Divided Europe Reunited: Promoting Human Rights and 
Civil Liberties in the OSCE Region in the 21st Century. Final Vilnius Declaration” (Vilnius: OSCE Parliamentary 
Assembly, 2009). For discussion, see Mälksoo, “Criminalizing Communism.” 
62
 0DáJRU]DWD 3DNLHU DQG %R 6WUnWK ³Introduction. A European Memory?,” in A European Memory? Contested 
Histories and Politics of Remembrance, ed. 0DáJRU]DWD3DNLHUDQG%R6WUnWK (New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books, 
2010), 6-7. 
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Nazi and Soviet (or the latter’s puppet communist) totalitarian regimes.63 While the concept of 
totalitarianism has gone out of fashion due to its Cold War associations in scholarly literature,64 
Adam Michnik’s outcry that “there is no such thing as non-totalitarian ruling communism. It 
either becomes totalitarian or it ceases to be communism” still holds considerable appeal for 
those who have directly experienced the daily realities of Soviet and East European communist 
regimes.65 In European mnemopolitics, the notion of totalitarianism has thus been brought back 
in vogue by the informal Reconciliation of European Histories Group in the European 
Parliament, tilted towards eastern European representatives, and seeking to include “the 
experience of the postcommunist nations into common narrative of the European History.”66 
The Soviet Story, in spite of its controversial tone and occasionally debatable integrity, has 
clearly been a significant milestone, or memory event, in the course of this struggle as the 
sponsors of the film included notable Baltic MEPs, providing also the original target group (i.e. 
the European Parliament) for its mnemopolitical message.  
Hence, in addition to the bilateral and regional dimensions of the Baltic-Russian 
“memory war” on the remembrance of the Second World War and the overall assessment of 
the communist legacy, animating the mnemopolitical agenda of The Soviet Story, this film was 
designed with an aim of provoking further transnational resonance for the broader European 
63
 Mälksoo, “Criminalizing Communism,” 85. 
64
 Richard Ned Lebow, The Politics and Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012), 5. 
65
 Adam Michnik, Letters from Prison and Other Essays, trans. Maya Latynski (Berkeley & Los Angeles: 
University of California Press), 47. See further Maria Mälksoo, “Introduction,” in Historical Memory versus 
Communist Identity, ed. Meelis Saueauk (Tartu: University of Tartu Press, 2014), 9-18. 
66
 See http://eureconciliation.wordpress.com/about/ (accessed: February 2, 2018). 
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community. From the vantage point of its director and international sponsors, The Soviet Story 
was intended to become a transformative opportunity for the wider European remembrance of 
the complex legacies of the Second World War and the deep scars left on eastern Europe by 
the subjugation under the Soviet power. Striving  to forge a particular kind of remembrance of 
the communist legacy at the European level broadly conceived, The Soviet Story seeks to 
provide a compelling set of “visual nodal points” – privileged discursive/visual signs that 
supply a partial fixation to structures of meaning.67 Although the operational logic of disclosure 
takes a back seat of the generally argumentative and explicitly instructional tone of the film 
wherein saying is privileged over showing,68 The Soviet Story nonetheless invokes strong 
emotions via its rich visual tapestry supporting the voice-over argument. 
 
Conclusion 
The transformation of the commonly held public perceptions about the Soviet legacy in and 
after the Second World War has clearly been the aim behind making and breaking The Soviet 
Story. Yet, it remains debatable whether its mono-narrative accusatory format that presents 
history in the black-and-white framework of aggressor and occupying nations, perpetrator and 
victim nations, claiming objectivity, has actually helped to reach out and engage the allegedly 
ignorant masses of the West. Although ascertaining reception and impact of documentary genre 
67
 Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics 
(London: Verso, 1985), 112, cited in Lene Hansen, “How Images Make World Politics: International Icons and 
the Case of Abu Ghraib,” Review of International Studies 41, no. 2 (2015): 263-88, 265. 
68
 Cf. Van Munster and Sylvest, “Documenting International Relations,” 233-35. 
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remains challenging,69 it is fair to suggest that The Soviet Story’s replay of some themes from 
the German Historikerstreit of the 1980s, even though from an idiosyncratic Baltic perspective, 
might have contributed to increased wariness instead of sympathy among those who have been 
subjected to the blunt attempt of convincing them about the true archetypicality of the Soviet 
totalitarian model and the depiction of Nazi Germany as essentially its younger mimicker.  
The film fails to meet the criteria of critical history, in spite of its pretensions for 
representing the documentary genre.70 There are sweeping generalizations regarding, for 
instance, the alleged uniformity of the Western public opinion on the assessment of the legacy 
of communism in Europe, or the lack of attention to nuances between the manifold Marxist 
ideologues and the Soviet practice of communism. The film utilizes a tactic of crude 
information offensive while criticizing the Soviet and implicitly also the current Russian 
version of such conduct, in historical and contemporary contexts concurrently. Regardless of 
the nominally documentary format, The Soviet Story’s “arrangements of perceptibility” or “the 
creative arrangement of sensorial perceptions (speech, sounds, music, visuals)”71 work 
purposefully to achieve a particularly dramatic effect of presenting a historical narrative. In the 
helpful schema developed by Rens Van Munster and Casper Sylvest, differentiating between 
three operational modalities of documentary films, The Soviet Story represents the genre 
wherein saying is privileged over showing, as its aim is “to expose false beliefs” and to reveal 
69
 Ibid., 231. 
70
 For a resonating criticism, see Katja Wezel, “Latvia’s ‘Soviet Story’. Transitional Justice and the Politics of 
Commemoration,” October 25, 2009, http://www.satori.lv/article/latvias-soviet-story-transitional-justice-and-
the-politics-of-commemoration#sdendnote20sym (accessed: February 2, 2018).  
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“the hidden truth” with the support of images, sounds, and other effects. Due to its aspirations 
to enlighten the audience via a particular perspective, this type of documentary film is overtly 
political, taking a stance in an ideological struggle and seeking to influence contemporary 
political mobilization around a particular cause (such as the acknowledgement of continuity 
between the Soviet Union and contemporary Russia). 72 
The jury is still out on the mnemopolitical efficiency of The Soviet Story’s propaganda 
film format. It could easily be the case that the works by such mnemopolitical artisans as an 
Estonian writer and documentary film-maker Imbi Paju and a Finnish historical novelist Sofi 
Oksanen manage to touch and convince the public about the crimes of the Soviet regime more 
profoundly than a fly-in-your-face-type of campaign launched by The Soviet Story.73 In their 
films and books, Paju and Oksanen have opted for the psychoanalytic collages of real people’s 
memories and historical facts, as well as for openly fictionalized ways of working through the 
communist experience of the Estonians. As a result, their works have a potential to 
communicate the experiences of the Soviet-subjugated nations in a more nuanced way 
compared to the rather monolithic Soviet Story told in the tradition of j’accuse, externalizing 
the totalitarian atrocities from the Baltic nations’ own behaviour during and after the war, and 
leaving thus the complex questions of war-time collaboration and complicity untouched. While 
equally condemning the attempts of condoning and denial of the Soviet criminal legacy, 
72
 Ibid., 233-35. 
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Oksanen and Paju’s oeuvre has chosen a subtler way of narrating the repressed memories of 
the Baltic nations through the focus on individual human experiences. Instead of pouring all 
vigour in proving the point of which totalitarian ‘evil’ came first, their accounts have sought to 
grasp the sufferings of the subjugated people under the communist regime in order to arouse 
universal empathy via the narration of the individual experience. As Imbi Paju explained the 
story behind the Memories Denied – indeed a very personal documentary about her own mother 
and aunt’s repressed memories of the sufferings under the Soviet regime: 
I believe that any kind of pain that is recreated on film, in a book, in a work of art, 
changes the source of its meaning, creating a new event. The screen is like a mirror in 
which the viewer does not directly see oneself; what the viewer sees gives birth to a 
feeling, which in turn creates an experience, an experience through which the viewer 
becomes a participant in the process of laying open this pain. And this pain often has 
universal significance.74 
As an emblematic piece of the Baltic mnemonical militancy, The Soviet Story has 
nonetheless proven to be a great mobilizer of political passions with its offering of a radical 
political alternative to the set-in patterns of public remembrance of the Second World War and 
the hierarchy of totalitarian crimes. The production and reception of The Soviet Story 
underscore the pertinence of Jay Winter’s observation about memory amounting to “history 
seen through affect.”75 With its clearly defined mnemopolitical position, The Soviet Story 
74
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embodies the power of the actual confrontation between different ways of remembering and 
relating to the Soviet Union.76 Perhaps inevitably, it also exemplifies the tendency of such 
robust mnemopolitical messages to invoke violently disagreeing responses (as the painful 
popular and governmental reactions in Russia indeed affirm), reproduce and amplify spirals of 
mutual insecurity. In all, both the accuser and the defendant in the case of The Soviet Story 
seemingly share the assumption that a state’s biographical self-narrative can only be made 
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